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INTRODUCTION 
 
The limits of substantive criminal law are extensively discussed within the confines of criminal 
legal theory, but seldom are the principles devised in criminal theory transferred into 
practicality. The European Court of Human Rights has dealt with many cases where it 
decided whether the criminalisation of certain conduct was in violation of the European 
Convention on Human Rights in the specific case before it, making many references to its 
doctrine of the “margin of appreciation” in undertaking this task. The scope of this study only 
covers criminalisation cases that have been seen at the European Court under the right to 
respect for private life enshrined in Article 8 of the Convention. Since the aim of both criminal 
theory and the analysis of the Court in such cases is to draw the boundary between the 
autonomy of the individual and the state’s legitimate area of substantive criminalisation, this 
study aims to determine whether the Court in determining the breadth of the margin of 
appreciation in these cases followed any identifiable pattern that can be explained through the 
principles of criminalisation which are the limits of substantive criminal law that have been 
conceived in criminal legal theory.  
  
Following the perspective of liberal criminal theory, six such cases will be analysed in Chapter 
3, after an explanation of the mentioned principles of criminalisation in Chapter 1, and a 
description of the Court’s interpretation of the Convention and the Article concerned in 
Chapter 2. The observations made through the analysis in Chapter 3 will be recited and 
further discussed in Chapter 4 before concluding that even though there are identifiable 
patterns of the use of principles of criminalisation in the Court’s determination of the breadth 
of the margin of appreciation, these patterns do not amount to a principled reasoning 
compatible with any specific conception of criminal legal theory.  
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CHAPTER I- THE THEORY OF CRIMINALISATION 
 
A) The State’s Power to Criminalise  
 
The state’s power to criminalise human conduct is based on no other than its sovereignty.1 In 
the modern notion of the state, sovereignty rests in the hands of the citizens who delegate 
representatives to act on their behalf.2 It is this delegated power that is exercised through 
criminal legislation,3 since it is this delegated power that gives the state authority to make 
laws and establish institutions to enforce them.4  
 
State sovereignty is not unlimited, constitutionalism and the rule of law serve to limit 
sovereignty5 and protect the rights of the individual from the arbitrary use of this power.6 
Criminal law being a representation of the state’s monopoly of the use of physical force within 
its territory,7 many guarantees have been put into place to ensure that this force is not used 
arbitrarily. The principle of legality dictates that criminal law must be general, promulgated, 
non-retroactive and clear;8 however these requirements of legality are neutral towards the 
substantive aims pursued through criminal law. 9 
 
Criminalisation, the act of defining certain human conduct as criminal offences and assigning 
to them a range of criminal law sanctions, 10  is undeniably a political process. 11  It is the 
criminal policy of the state that determines the substantive content of criminal law12. This 
                                                        
 
1 John Locke, Second Treatise of Government (first published1690, Hackett Publishing Company 
1980),8. 
2 Jean Jacques Rousseau, ‘On Social Contract’, in Alan Ritter and Julia Conaway Bondanella 
Rousseau’s Political Writings (W.W. Norton & Company 1988), 105. 
3 Simeneh K. Assefa, ‘Sovereignty, Legitimacy, and Fundamental Rights as Limitations to the 
Criminalization Power of the State’ (2018) 12:1 Mizan Law Review 127,146. 
4 Assefa (n 3) 131. // Cesare Beccaria, ‘Suçlar ve Cezalar Hakkında’ (Of Crimes and Punishments), 
trans. by Sami Selçuk (Imge 2016), 29. 
5 ibid 128. 
6 Geranne Lautenbach,  The Concept of the Rule of Law and the European Court of Human Rights 
(Oxford University Press 2013) 3. 
7 Nina Persak, Criminalising Harmful Conduct: The Harm Principle, its Limits and Continental 
Counterparts (Springer 2007) 9. 
8 Lautenbach (n 6) 46. 
9 ibid 47. 
10 Persak (n 7) 6. 
11 ibid 5. 
12 Zeki Hafızoğulları, Ceza Normu: Normatif Bir Yapı Olarak Ceza Hukuku Düzeni (2nd edn, US-A 
Yayıncılık 1992) 5. 
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power to criminalise is immense, it divides the population into criminals and non-criminals,13 it 
shapes society as much as it is shaped by it. In order to ensure that this power is not used 
arbitrarily, criminalisation ought to be guided by principles that are consistent with liberal 
values.14 
 
Constitutions and human rights documents define a private sphere of the individual into which 
the government cannot interfere.15  In the national legal space, legislatures have broad power 
to establish what conduct will be criminalised, yet their decisions can be overturned by 
constitutional courts when they infringe the limits set by the constitution.16 In the international 
space, human rights can only set boundaries to the substantive content of law as long as 
human rights treaties are signed and institutions are set up to determine the scope of state 
obligations that the rights entail.17 The European Court of Human Rights that will be the focus 
of this study, considers the cases that come before it to see if in that specific case 
criminalisation of the conduct constituted a violation of a right enshrined in the European 
Convention on Human Rights. The quest for drawing the boundaries between the autonomy 
of the individual and the conduct the state may legitimately criminalise however, is not easy.18  
 
For centuries philosophers and criminal theorists have attempted to come up with a 
consistent set of principles to determine the scope of human conduct that may legitimately be 
criminalised, yet a “grand theory” for criminalisation has not been established.19 Nevertheless, 
some principles of legitimate criminalisation have been identified and even though there is 
hardly any consensus on their definition and scope, they are useful in untangling and 
analysing the discussions surrounding criminalisation. The rest of this Chapter will be 
dedicated to understanding some of the most prominent views on the principles of 
criminalisation.  
                                                        
13 Persak (n 7) 6. 
14 ibid 4. 
15 Lautenbach (n 6) 57. // Kai Möller, ‘From Constitutional to Human Rights: On the Moral Structure of 
International Human Rights’ (2014) 3 Global Constitutionalism, 373, 376. 
16 Esteban Restrepo Saldarriaga, ‘Poisoned Gifts: Old Moralities under New Clothes?’, in Alice M. Miller, 
Mindy Jane Roseman, Beyond Virtue and Vice: Rethinking Human Rights and Criminal Law (University 
of Pennsylvania Press 2019), 201. 
17 Lautenbach (n 6) 61. 
18 Lautenbach (n 6) 61. 
19 Saldarigga (n 16) 199. 
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B) Aims of Criminal Law 
 
In order to start a discussion over what conduct ought to be criminalised and what conduct 
ought not, it is indispensible to consider the aims of criminal law. Criminal law is distinct from 
other bodies of law because it not only prohibits certain actions but also threatens individuals 
with a certain punishment in the event that the prohibited action is committed. 20  The 
enactment of the threat contained in criminal legislation is one of the most intrusive and 
repressive acts of state power21, therefore it must be justified in its aims. The most commonly 
suggested purposes for the criminal law are as follows: the deterrence of offences, the 
rehabilitation of offenders, the disablement of offenders from reoffending, sharpening the 
community’s sense of right and wrong and the satisfaction of the community’s sense of just 
retribution.22 Each of these purposes are complex and none of them can be said to be wholly 
excluding the others23.  
 
Instead of the ex post aims of criminal law that are the aims of punishment, this study will 
focus on the ex ante aims of criminal law, which are the aims of criminalisation. The 
criminalisation of a conduct declares that the conduct is wrongful and should not be done, and 
deploys a supplementary reason not to do it, threatens with punishment.24  Today, these 
authoritative judgements of wrongfulness are made by the state on behalf of the wider 
community, since this valuation of the conduct stems from the state’s authority and the state 
takes its authority from its citizens.25  
 
Criminalisation also aims at clearly defining those acts that are prohibited by the state. The 
principle of legality today dictates that no person shall be punished for violating a rule that 
was non-existent or unclear at the time they acted26, therefore criminal legal codes draw clear 
                                                        
20A.P. Simester, Andreas von Hirsch, Crimes, Harms, and Wrongs: On the Principles of Criminalisation 
(Hart Publishing,  2011) 3. 
21 Persak (n 7) 1. 
22 Henry M. Hart, ‘The Aims of the Criminal Law’ (1958) 23 Law and Contemporary Problems, 401. 
23 ibid. 
24 Simester, Hirsch (n 20) 6. 
25 Simester, Hirsch (n 20) 13. 
26 Peter Westen, Two Rules of Legality in Criminal Law (2007) 26 Law and Philosophy 229, 303. 
  5 
lines between permissible and impermissible conduct, and the criminal justice system relies 
on citizens knowing these lines and governing their conduct accordingly.27  
 
Once it is made public that a certain act has been criminalised, citizens are entitled to expect 
the state to see its commitment through, the state’s willingness to carry out the threats is 
essential to the deterrent effect of criminalisation.28  
 
C) Limits of Substantive Criminal Law 
 
The question of what a “crime” is, can be approached from a variety of theoretical 
perspectives that can be broadly divided into two categories: positivist theory, and non-
positivist theory.29 Positivist theory conceives that law is a social construct and therefore its 
systemic validity is sufficient for its enforcement. 30 Positivists argue that legal philosophy 
should be concerned not with speculation about the morality of law but rather with 
understanding the nature of law as it exists. 31  Non-positivists argue that since criminal 
sanction is the most drastic of the state’s institutional tools for regulating the conduct of 
individuals, it should be deployed only where supported by convincing justifications.32 They 
seek to determine the boundaries of liberty and the limits of criminalisation, and in 
undertaking this task they employ various concepts and principles.33  
 
The substantive limits of criminalisation have developed differently in Continental European 
and Anglo-American legislations. When in Continental European legislations the concept of a 
“Rechtsgut”, a “legally protected interest” has been employed in an attempt to limit the state in 
the range of conducts it may criminalise, in Anglo-American legislations four principles that 
carry the same aim have emerged. The said principles are: the harm principle, the offense 
principle, legal paternalism, and legal moralism.  
                                                        
27 John M. Darley, Paul H. Robinson, Kevin M. Carlsmith, ‘The Ex Ante Function of Criminal Law’ (2001) 
35 Law & Society Review 165, 165. 
28 Simester, Hirsch  (n 20) 10. 
29 Mouaid Al Qudah, ‘The Moral Foundations of Criminal Liability’ (2014) 2 International Property Rights 
Open Access 116, 116. 
30 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Legal Positivism, available at: 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-positivism/#3, accessed: 24.08.2019. 
31 Qudah, (n 29) 116. 
32 Simester, Hirsch (n 20) 19. 
33 Qudah, (n 29) 3. 
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1. Continental Theory of the Limits of Substantive Criminal Law 
 
In order to discuss theoretical criminal law, it is essential to start by dissecting crime into its 
elements. Various dissections of crime into its elements have been made, and to this day 
there is no consensus on how many separate elements there must be. If the opinion that 
there are three elements to crime will be adopted here for the sake of argument, it can be said 
that crime consists of the following elements: the material element, the moral element, and 
the legal element. The material element relates to the external facet of the crime, it is the act, 
the commission or omission itself. The moral element is the culpability of the person who has 
committed the said act. The legal element embodies the principle of legality, 34  it is the 
necessity that the act must infringe a criminal prohibition. It is the legal element that is 
concerned with criminalisation. For a “crime” to occur therefore, there must be a commission 
or omission that has been committed by a culpable person, and this act must have infringed a 
criminal prohibition that had previously been put into place by the state. In the event that one 
of these elements is missing, there would be no crime.  
 
Liberal non-positivist Continental criminal law theorists have come up with the theory of a 
“Rechtsgut” to limit the state in the range of conducts it can criminalise.35 According to the 
Rechtsgutstheorie, there exist “legal goods”, which are the legally protected interests of 
individuals or other legal entities, or of certain collectives, which precede the making of the 
law. 36  Those who support this theory argue that when a crime is committed there are two 
“wrongs” that occur in the legal element of the crime, the first is the “formal wrong”, the fact 
that the law the state had put down has been breached; the second is the “material wrong”, 
the fact that harm has been done to the “legal good”, the legally protected interest the 
existence and value of which preceded the law.37 For liberal non-positivist continental criminal 
law theorists then, for the criminalisation of a certain act to be justified there must be an 
                                                        
34 Albin Eser, ‘The Principle of “Harm” in the Concept of Crime: a Comparative Analysis of the Criminally 
protected Legal Interests’ (1966) 4:3 Duquesne Law Review 345, 355. 
35 Tatjana Hörnle, ’Theories of Criminalization’ in Markus Dubber, Tatjana Hörnle The Oxford Handbook 
of Criminal Law, (Oxford University Press 2014) available at: 
https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199673599.001.0001/oxfordhb-
9780199673599-e-30 accessed: 09.08.2019, 7. 
36 Persek (n 7) 106. 
37 Eser (n 34) 348. 
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identifiable “material wrong”, the infringement of a value, an interest that already existed 
before the legal rule was made to protect it. This theory attempted to limit the scope of 
justifiable criminalisation by asserting that criminal prohibitions can only be justified when 
made for the purpose of protecting interests worthy of such protection.38 
 
Continental legal positivists however, have argued that the “legally protected interest” can be 
any interest that is of value in the eyes of the legislator for the “welfare of society”.39 They 
have maintained that the “legal good” is what the positive law says it is, and rejected the idea 
that a “legal good” can have any normative value independent of the lawmaker.40  This 
argument breaks the distinction that non-positivists have made between a “formal wrong” and 
a “material wrong” because if whatever the lawmaker deems as against the welfare of society 
and criminalises constitutes a material wrong, then the material wrong is no longer different 
from the formal wrong which is the breach of the legislation itself.41  This argument can be, 
and has been deployed by lawmakers to legislate as they see fit in order to advance their own 
idea of the welfare of society.42 
 
In order for “legal goods” to play a critical role in criminalisation, they have to be 
conceptualised as something beyond the positive criminal law. 43  There is no list of a 
classification of recognised legal goods and it is easy to fall prey to the positivist approach44 
that claims that the “legal good” need not precede criminalisation, it can be created and 
recognized with criminalisation itself. The Rechtsgut doctrine today is rather ambivalent and 
has not been successful in its aim to limit the range of conduct that the state may legitimately 
criminalise.45 
 
 
                                                        
38 Eser (n 34) 351. 
39 Zeki Hafızoğulları, Muharrem Özen, Türk Ceza Hukuku Genel Hükümler, (US-A Yayıncılık, 2012) 
226. 
40 Persek (n 7) 107. 
41 Hafızoğulları, Özen Türk Ceza Hukukuku  (n 39) 226.  
42 Eser (n 34) 349. 
43 Persek (n 7) 110. 
44 Persek (n 7) 117. 
45 Persek (n 7) 118. 
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2. Anglo-American Theory on the Limits of Substantive Criminal Law  
 
The Anglo-American tradition, as has been mentioned, generally recognises four basic 
principles of criminalisation. Legal moralism, the harm principle, the offense principle and 
legal paternalism are subject to wide dispute since there is no consensus as to which ones 
constitute good justification for criminalisation46, there is also much disagreement as to which 
criminal prohibitions can be well justified through which of the principles.  
 
2.1 Harm Principle and Legal Moralism 
 
Any evaluation of the criteria for criminalisation in modern academia starts with John Stuart 
Mill’s “Harm Principle”. In his essay “On Liberty”, published in 1859, Mill famously declares 
“The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized 
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.”47 The harm principle has been used 
in argumentation as a limiting principle with regard to the enforcement of morality.48 In 1873, 
Lord James Fitzjames Stephen published an attack on Mill’s essay in his book titled “Liberty, 
Equality, Fraternity” where he argued “There are acts of wickedness so gross and outrageous 
that self-protection apart, they must be prevented as far as possible at every cost to the 
offender, and punished, if they occur, with exemplary severity”.49 
 
A century later, in 1959, Patrick Devlin gave his famous lecture “The Enforcement of Morals” 
where he argued that morals and religion are inextricably joined, that it is impossible to claim 
that moral codes of society are not based on religion;50 but because the state cannot say that 
certain acts are criminalised because they are sinful, it must find some other way of justifying 
the punishments it imposes on wrongdoers.51 He suggests that what makes a “society” is a 
community of ideas,52 not only political but also moral, and argues that society should use law 
                                                        
46 Persek (n 7) 13. 
47 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (first published 1859, Bootche Books 2001) 13. 
48 Bernard E. Harcourt, ‘Collapse of the Harm Principle’ (1999) 90:1 Journal of Criminal Law and 
Criminology 109, 115. 
49 ibid 123. 
50 Patrick Devlin, ‘The Enforcement of Morals’ (1959) available at: 
http://psi329.cankaya.edu.tr/uploads/files/Devlin%2C%20The%20Enforcement%20of%20Morals%20%2
81959%29%281%29.pdf accessed: 08.08.2019, 132. 
51 ibid 133. 
52 ibid 136. 
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to enforce its moral judgements53 indeed. To ascertain the moral judgements of society, he 
introduces the idea of the “reasonable man” who “is not expected to reason about anything, 
and his judgement may be largely a matter of feeling.”54 He defines immorality for the purpose 
of the law as “what every right-minded person is presumed to consider to be immoral”.55 In 
the end he makes the point that any such immorality is capable of affecting society injuriously 
and this is what gives the law its locus standi56. 
 
H.L.A. Hart has observed in his “Law, Liberty and Morality” that there is a similarity in the 
general tone of Stephen and Devlin.57 Bernard E. Harcourt on the other hand has commented 
that Devlin’s arguments are different from those of Stephen because Devlin himself does not 
oppose Mill’s harm principle, he simply plays on the ambivalence in the notion of harm, 
defines public morality in terms of harm to society and opens up the door to what Harcourt 
calls “Conservative Liberalism”, which is the deployment of the harm principle by 
conservatives to justify laws that criminalise prostitution, pornography, drug use and many 
other acts conservatives are traditionally against.58 Harcourt concludes by arguing that there 
is no longer an argument within the structure of the debate to resolve the competing claims of 
harm, since “nontrivial harm arguments are being made about practically every moral 
offense”.59 He adds that “there is probably harm in most human activities”, and suggests that 
instead of broad prohibitions that affect entire categories of moral offenses, more nuanced 
remedies that address particular harms ought to be developed.60 
 
Ronald Dworkin in his article “Lord Devlin and the Enforcement of Morals” argues that what is 
shocking and wrong with Devlin’s legal moralism is not that the community’s morality counts, 
but his idea of what counts as the community’s morality.61 He admits that of course the 
legislator will apply tests to determine “the community’s morality” before legislating it, but the 
answer will depend upon the legislator’s own understanding of what the shared morality of 
                                                        
53 ibid 138. 
54 ibid 141. 
55 ibid 142. 
56 ibid 142. 
57 Harcourt (n 48)123. 
58 ibid 139. 
59 ibid 114. 
60 ibid 193. 
61 Ronald Dworkin, ‘Lord Devlin and the Enforcement of Morals’ (1966) 75 Yale Law Review 986, 1001. 
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society requires.62 “No legislator can afford to ignore the public’s outrage”, he continues, “it 
will set the boundaries of what is politically feasible, and it will determine the strategies of 
persuasion and enforcement within these boundaries. But we must not confuse strategy with 
justice, nor facts of political life with principles of political morality. Lord Devlin understands 
these distinctions, but his arguments will appeal most, I am afraid, to those who do not.”63 
 
Gerald Dworkin in his article “Devlin Was Right: Law and the Enforcement of Morality” 
declares that he sides with Hart in most issues concerning specific rights and gives as an 
example the fact that he does not think homosexual sex should be criminalised; but he agrees 
with Devlin in believing that there is no principled line following the contours of the distinction 
between immoral and harmful conduct such that only grounds referring to the latter may be 
invoked to justify criminalisation. 64  Bernard Harcourt criticises Gerald Dworkin’s stance, 
arguing that just like Devlin Dworkin seems to premise his argument on the assumption that 
harmless wrongdoing is not possible, and this collapses his legal moralism into the public 
harm thesis, making it indistinguishable from the harm principle.65  
 
Even though the harm principle starts out with the aim to limit the state in the range of 
conduct that it may legitimately criminalise by requiring it be limited to conduct which causes 
harm to others, the vague nature of the word “harm” has resulted in different views of what it 
entails. While some have maintained that “harm” should be narrowly interpreted, others have 
claimed that any sort of harm can be included in the principle, and have brought legal 
moralism into the sphere of justification of the harm principle through claims of “harm to 
society”. This ambivalence in the meaning of “harm” has caused stagnation in the deployment 
of the principle with liberal aims. 
 
 
                                                        
62 ibid 1002. 
63 ibid. 
64 Gerald Dworkin, ‘Devlin Was Right: Law and the Enforcement of Morality’ (1999) 40:927 William and 
Mary Law Review 927, 928. 
65 Harcourt, (n 48) 134-304. 
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2.2. Offense principle 
 
Joel Feinberg in the second book titled “Offense to Others” of his four-volume treatise “The 
Moral Limits of Criminal Law” published in 1988 suggests a new principle called the “offense 
principle” in order to cover those acts that do not constitute harm but may be legitimately 
criminalised under this new principle, so as to release the stagnation caused by the 
disagreement over the interpretation of the harm principle. Feinberg’s harm principle is 
different from Mill’s in the sense that whilst Mill’s harm principle is exclusive of any other 
principles, Feinberg’s can coexist with other principles.66 Feinberg defines harm as a “setback 
to interest”, an action that makes the harmed party worse off; and moves on to add that there 
are varieties of conduct that can be criminalised where the justification of doing so does not 
refer to harm.67 He contends, “there are human experiences that are harmless in themselves 
yet so unpleasant that we can rightly demand legal protection from them even at the cost of 
other persons’ liberties”.68  
 
Using a “ride on the bus” analogy to demonstrate the legitimacy of what he calls the “offense 
principle”, Feinberg asks the reader to imagine themselves in a bus where they have 
harmless but unpleasant experiences with other passengers, ranging from a passenger 
wearing a shirt with an unpleasant colour scheme to other passengers eating live slugs and 
fish heads, to public nudity, to other passengers smashing the head of a corpse in a coffin. 
Admitting that offense is a “less serious thing than harm”,69 he argues that acts causing 
offense may still be criminalised, taking the word “offense” not in the strict sense in ordinary 
language that is about the feelings of the affected party but as an objective wrong, saying “it is 
necessary that there be a wrong but not that the victim feel wronged.”70 Feinberg’s conclusion 
is that one’s private control of his “inner property” is violated when others obtrude their own 
sounds, shapes and affairs upon his “territory” without his consent, forcing him to experience 
                                                        
66 Persek (n 7) 13. 
67 A.P. Simester, Andrew Von Hirsch, ‘Rethinking the Offense Principle’ in Paul H. Robinson (ed), The 
Structure and Limits of Criminal Law (Ashgate 2014) 365. 
68 Joel Feinberg, The Moral Limits of Criminal Law vol. 2: Offense to Others (Oxford University Press 
1988) Chapter 7 ‘Offensive Nuisances’, available at 
https://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0195052153.001.0001/acprof-9780195052152, 13. 
69 ibid 3. 
70 ibid 3. 
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“disgusting, enraging activities” and violating “something like a property right”.71 Even though 
Feinberg endorses the offense principle as one of the legislative legitimizing principles, he 
argues that various restrictive standards to the offense principle need to be put in place,72 and 
suggests that these standards be 1) the intensity and durability of the repugnance produced, 
and the extent to which repugnance could be anticipated to be the general reaction of 
strangers to the conduct displayed or represented, 2) the case with which unwilling witnesses 
can avoid the offensive displays, 3) whether or not the witnesses have willingly assumed the 
risk of being offended either through curiosity or the anticipation of pleasure.73  
 
Simester and Hirsch in their article “Rethinking the Offense Principle” remark that Feinberg’s 
test for which offenses can be criminalised is capable of being tilted against prohibition by 
requiring that the balance must be strongly in favour of criminalisation.74 They agree with 
Feinberg on the argument that offensive states are not themselves a harm since they do not 
intrinsically set back the victim’s interests and well-being, 75  defining harm as “a loss of 
opportunity on the part of the victim”.76 In their conclusion they stress that a successful life 
requires that there be conciliation between an individual’s way of life and the society in which 
they live, something that depends on the individual being permitted to express their own 
values and chosen life in a tolerant environment, and that there is need to accommodate 
diverse and sometimes inconsistent styles of life.77 
  
Feinberg’s narrow definition of harm and creation of a new offense principle is a good step for 
the liberal minimalist approach to criminalisation in the sense that it prevents the harm 
principle from unduly expanding via the broadening of the notion of harm. 78 The offense 
principle is still suitable to being interpreted so widely that it may be used to justify legal 
                                                        
71 ibid 23. 
72 Joel Feinberg, , The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law vol. 2: Offense to Others (Oxford University 
Press 1988) Chapter 8  ‘Mediating the Offense Principle’, available at: 
https://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0195052153.001.0001/acprof-9780195052152 , 23. 
73 ibid 2. 
74 Simester, Hirsch, Rethinking the Offense Principle, (n 67) 368. 
75 ibid 379. 
76 ibid 377. 
77 ibid 391. 
78 Persek (n 7) 15. 
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moralism, therefore it is important that the limitations Feinberg and Simester and Hirsch offer 
for the offense principle are followed.  
 
2.3. Legal paternalism 
 
John Stuart Mill’s “harm principle” requires that the infamous “harm” be done to “others” for 
state intervention to be justified. Harm that the person does to himself is no legitimate reason 
for state intervention since to Mill “Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is 
sovereign.”79 Immanuel Kant on the other hand, argues that the person who wilfully engages 
in or solicits self-harming behaviour will have disrespected the humanity in his own person, 
which would justify a state committed to the flourishing of all its citizens to have a reason to 
intervene in self-harming conduct.80 
 
The restriction of the freedom and choices of individuals with the aim to protect them from 
themselves has been referred to as “paternalism”.81  Paternalism assumes that individual 
agents are not always able to make the judgement of what is good for them. The argument 
against paternalism is that there is no reason to believe legislators to be in a better position to 
make such judgement.82 What legislators interpret as harm may be perceived by the person 
concerned as beneficial, a reasonable choice consistent with their interests.83 Paternalistic 
arguments could thus be a roundabout way of promoting a conception of what is “good”, at 
the expense of individual liberty.84  
 
Feinberg writes that it is important to distinguish between paternalistic behaviour generally, 
and paternalistic rules that are coercive interferences with liberty. He offers the example of 
prescribing placebos to healthy but anxious patients, or withholding the truth from deathbed 
                                                        
79 Mill (n 47) 13. 
80 John Kleinig, ‘The Paternalistic Principle’ (2016) 10 Criminal Law and Philosophy 315, 320. 
81 Cristophe Béal, ‘Can Paternalism Be Soft? Paternalism and Criminal Justice’, (2011) 4:44 Presses de 
Science Po- Raisons Politiques, 41, 42. 
82 ibid 44. 
83 ibid 45. 
84 ibid 46. 
  14 
patients.85 Simester and Hirsch agree that paternalistic intervention outside of the criminal law 
is a different matter than criminal legal paternalism and opine that it cannot be argued that it 
would be good to knock down paternalism altogether. 86  
 
i.Soft paternalism  
 
In order to find a way for the state to be able to intervene paternalistically without imposing its 
own ideas of good and bad on individuals, Feinberg conceives a “soft paternalism” that can 
be justified through the notion of autonomy conceived as a form of personal sovereignty.87 
The idea is to maximize the wellbeing of individuals while preserving their autonomy through 
having paternalistic legislation be justified with the consent of those who experience its 
interference.88  
 
This explanation of autonomy would expect the individual to act according to a coherent set of 
goals of his individual choice and their right to control their affairs with personal values and 
beliefs will be respected.89 There will be no intervention by the state when the individual acts 
in apparently self-destructive behaviour that is part of a fuller life-conception or plan of their 
own.90 The writer who drinks and smokes because he is inspired through this choice of life will 
not be interfered with, because they are acting in accordance with their long-term goals; even 
the person who takes excessive risks because they believe they are unusually skilful or lucky 
can, unless they suffer from significant mental illness, make their decisions without 
interference by the state.91  
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In the end, this theory allows the state to intervene into the consent of individuals by way of 
invoking temporary restraint on them only if the individual has identifiable long-term goals and 
the act that will be interfered with would apparently frustrate these goals.92 Gerald Dworkin 
asserts that intervention should only be permissible if the self-harm is potentially grave and 
irreversible, the person appears to be acting under unusual stress, the duration of the 
intervention is limited, and there will be restrictions of repeated interventions. 93  Andrew 
Hirsch rejects soft paternalism and holds that self-determination should involve disposing of 
one’s interests as one now chooses, irrespective of the supposed longer-range preferences 
one has developed previously.94 
 
It is true that state intervention may be designed to protect and improve the quality of people’s 
lives and to promote the goods of human welfare. Indeed, many kinds of non-penal state 
intervention are already in place for this purpose.95  When it comes to criminal paternalistic 
prohibitions however, the state rules out some options for individuals permanently, options 
which may be valuable for the individual who is often better placed than the state to make 
nuanced judgements about the effects of a contemplated action in the particular 
circumstances. 96  Another important point is that in a pluralistic society where multiple 
reasonable conceptions of what is good coexist, criminal jurisdictions should not condemn 
actions for the simple reason that they contradict a particular idea of what is a good 
conception of happiness.97  
 
ii.Criminal legal paternalism 
 
When the state attaches a criminal sanction to one harming one’s self, or one harming a 
consenting other, it is criminal legal paternalism at play. Historically, the victim’s consent was 
a defense against prosecution. The maxim “volenti fit non injuria”, meaning “a person is not 
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wronged by that to which he consents”98 was recognized in Roman law as early as the sixth 
century99 and applied to all kinds of criminal sanction.100 The monopolization of the system of 
punishment by the state and the king’s becoming the ultimate victim and the sole prosecutor 
of a criminal act was the historical reason for the rejection of the consent of the victim as a 
defence.101 In one of the earliest English cases where this rejection occurred, the court’s 
opinion was that by maiming the willing victim, the defendant had deprived the king of the aid 
and assistance of one of his subjects.102 Today the argument for not recognising the consent 
of the victim as a defence lies not in the benefit of the king, but in the benefit of the victim 
concerned.  
 
A distinction is to be made between legislation that prohibits acts that harm one’s self and 
those that harm a consenting other. The first kind has been referred to as pure paternalism or 
direct paternalism,103 whereas the second kind has been referred to as impure paternalism or 
indirect paternalism.104 Clearly the two forms of paternalism do not have the same legal 
scope, and they raise different problems.105  
 
Pure paternalism   
 
Pure paternalistic criminal laws claim to be aimed at protecting the individual from himself, but 
the use of penal sanction with its depravations and censure does not promote the interests of 
the individual in the end.106 It is inconceivable that punishment that makes the individual 
worse off could promote the individual’s best interest.107 However, with the recent tendency to 
reduce criminal sanctions for pure paternalistic crimes such as drug use, it has become 
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possible to argue that modest criminal penalties may not necessarily be worse for the 
individual than their own self-destructive conduct.108 However, it is still hard to argue that the 
censure function criminalisation carries which is the expression of disapproval of the 
perpetrator for the wrongfulness of their conduct, the public recognition of a “wrong”, is 
compatible with the state’s claim of protection of the individual. 109  If the state’s aim in 
criminalising self-harming behaviour is to safeguard the individual’s options for the future as is 
claimed, then a non-penal disincentive would be a more appropriate response.110 
 
Impure Paternalism 
 
Impure paternalism in criminal law is when the victim and the perpetrator of a crime are 
different individuals, where the victim has consented to the harm that the perpetrator has 
caused them. The moral and legal effects of consent need to be discussed when it comes to 
discussing impure paternalism, along with whether one has an unlimited right to authorize 
another person to harm them.111 
 
The ability to consent is a central manifestation of personhood and individual autonomy. To 
be able to consent, one must be an agent who has reached a certain level of maturity, this is 
why young persons and those with mental illnesses do not possess the capacity to 
consent.112 In the absence of such impairment however, one’s consent is valid and at the 
centre of their legal life; the consent of the governed is so important that it is seen as the only 
source of legitimacy of state power in modern political theory.113 However the rules governing 
individuals’ ability to consent to being harmed by others are very strict, and also morally and 
conceptually incoherent.114 
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Consent carries an inculpatory role in criminal law, as in, consensual sex is not rape, 
consensual possession of others’ belongings is not theft and consensual presence on other 
people’s premises is not trespass.115 But in other cases, especially in cases of bodily harm, 
this inculpatory role of the consent of the victim vanishes.116  
 
There are some arguments that look to justify this loss of consent of its inculpatory role in 
different cases. These arguments revolve around the validity and voluntariness of consent. 
One of these arguments is that the victim who consented to being harmed was not rational. 
This argument exhibits circular reasoning: “a person who consents to X is insane because 
one has to be insane to consent to X”, and when the victim’s insanity is thus established and 
his consent invalidated, criminal conviction of the perpetrator automatically follows.117 The 
second argument that is used with the same purpose is to claim that consent was not 
voluntary. This argument follows that under certain circumstances people may not act entirely 
voluntarily even when they are not subjected to formal duress or coercion; it could be that 
they were vulnerable because they were young, it could be that they were vulnerable due to 
constant pain, and this vulnerability may be exploited by others.118 There may be truth in this 
argument, it has been claimed that cases of acute or chronic pain can impair consent, for 
example.119 However, where the lawmaker has concerns regarding the consent of the victim 
in a certain scenario, it should direct the law towards a removal of the said uncertainties by 
demanding persuasive proof of valid consent, and not by taking away the power to consent 
altogether.120  
 
As Louis Henkin has aptly put it, “Motives and purposes for legislation are notoriously elusive, 
ambiguous, and multifarious.”121 This chapter has aimed to demonstrate the complexity and 
intricacy of the various categories of justifications for criminal legislation. As there is no 
consensus among scholars on which justifications are legitimate, there is no consensus 
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among scholars on which justifications legitimately justify which criminal prohibitions. In fact 
there are so many inconsistencies with what is criminalised and what isn’t, it is not possible to 
come up with a theoretically satisfactory explanation for existing criminalisation. 122  This 
impossibility lies in the fact that the explanation for the criminalisation of different actions is 
rooted not in logical or ethical, but historical and ideological standards.123 
 
This complexity in the theoretical sphere transfers to practicality as a lack of a firm limitation 
on the state’s power of criminalisation. The concern in practicality is not whether it is 
legitimate to legislate morality, since it is almost impossible to define and locate morality in 
law; but rather what the appropriate limits of criminal policy must be. 124 Even though we 
cannot devise a consistent theory of what ought to be criminalised, we can still argue what 
ought not be criminalised, relying on a conception of an inviolable privacy, a freedom from 
state interference.125  
 
The rest of this study will be dedicated to examining how the European Court of Human 
Rights interprets the right to private life contained in Article 8 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights when deciding on the legitimacy of state interference with the right through 
criminalisation, and analysing how the Court has used criminal theory in its undertaking of this 
task.  
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CHAPTER II- INTERPRETATION OF THE CONVENTION 
 
As Steven Malby rightly points out, bringing criminal theory and international human rights law 
together is no easy task because while criminal theory is a theoretical exercise that is 
concerned with an ideal, critical moral approach of what should and should not be 
criminalised, international human rights law deals with a ready text, a treaty, and whether the 
state failed to satisfy its obligations arising from the treaty.126 The Court then cannot purely 
deal with the ideal dimension of the matter as it has to remain in the boundaries that the 
Convention confines it to. To understand the Court’s case law then, it is essential to 
understand how the Convention is interpreted. This chapter aims at briefly describing the 
Court’s interpretation of the Convention generally, and then its interpretation of Article 8.  
 
A) General Interpretation of the Convention 
 
The Vienna Convention on The Law of Treaties asserts that “a treaty shall be interpreted in 
good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in 
their context and in the light of its object and purpose”.127 Drawn from the principles in the 
Vienna Convention, the interpretation of the European Convention has been dominated by 
the “purposive approach” which permits the application of meanings that are in alignment with 
the object and purpose of the treaty.128 It should be fair to say however that the Vienna 
Convention has played a minor role in the interpretation of the ECHR since the Court has 
created its own labels for the interpretative techniques it uses, such as “living instrument”, 
“practical and effective rights” and “autonomous concepts”.129  
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1. Object and Purpose  
 
Textual originalism is a theory of interpretation of legal texts that ties the text to the meaning it 
would have had at the time that it became law. 130  Supporters of this view to treaty 
interpretation argue that treaties must be interpreted like private contracts are, where only that 
which the contractors at the time of the contract agreed to, binds them.131 They maintain that 
states should have knowledge of the obligations they are undertaking when signing a treaty, 
and international tribunals would only be justified in substituting themselves for the convention 
makers if the States Parties clearly intend to delegate this power to them.132 Non-originalists 
on the other hand, argue for “unenumerated” rights which are rights that are not expressly 
mentioned in the text of the law but should be “read into” it. 133 This was the case in Golder v 
UK where the Court read the right of access to a court into the right to fair trial contained in 
Article 6.134 The Court in its decision referred to the Vienna Convention that hadn’t come into 
force yet, accepting that its provisions represented customary international law. By the 
guidance of the “object and purpose” found in the Preamble of the ECHR where the drafting 
states resolved to take the first steps for the collective enforcement of rights in furtherance of 
the rule of law, the Court found that one could not suppose compliance with the rule of law 
without the possibility of taking legal disputes to court,135 and concluded that the right of 
access to court was “in the very terms” of Article 6.136  
 
Since Golder, the Court has endorsed the idea that the Convention must be interpreted in 
present-day conditions rather than what the drafters intended in 1950, it has recognized rights 
the drafters had not clearly intended to grant and it has recognized rights the drafters had 
clearly intended not to grant.137 The use of the Vienna Convention in Golder has led to the 
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rejection of originalism and the creation of the Court’s own doctrines of interpretation such as 
“autonomous concepts” and “evolutive interpretation”.138  
 
2. Autonomous Concepts 
 
The Court has frequently used the ordinary meaning of words in order to interpret the 
Convention; however in instances where the terms used in the Convention did not point at 
identical concepts among the Contracting Parties, the Court has resorted to adopting its own 
rules to determine the meanings of such terms in order to secure uniformity of treatment.139  
 
The Engel and Others v Netherlands case was the beginning of the Court’s case law that 
would be named “the theory of autonomous concepts”.140 In the Engel case the Government 
stated that the proceedings against the applicants were classified as “disciplinary” and 
reminded that Article 6 only refers to criminal charges, disciplinary proceedings were not 
included in the text of the article. 141  Even though it is well-established that disciplinary 
offences are distinct from criminal offences, the Court expressed the fear that some acts or 
omissions may be classified by the state either intentionally or innocently as disciplinary 
offences and therefore escape the guarantees of Article 6, and went on to create a separate 
concept of a “criminal charge”. 142  “Autonomous concepts” give the Court “semantic 
independence”, the definition in national law constitutes no more than a starting point in 
interpreting the autonomous meaning of a concept in the context of the Convention143 since 
autonomous concepts should be interpreted according to the common denominator of the 
respective legislation of the various contracting parties.144 Since Engel, many autonomous 
concepts have been identified by the Court and the former Commission.145 
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After introducing the notion of a common denominator, in Engel, the Court noted that the very 
“nature of the offence” was more important than the domestic law classification. George 
Letsas argues that the Court set out to discover the real nature of a “criminal offence”, 
something constant and objective.146 
 
3. Living Instrument, Evolutive Interpretation  
 
In Tyrer v UK, the Court had to decide whether judicial corporal punishment of juveniles 
amounts to degrading punishment within the meaning Article 3 of the Convention. The State 
claimed that it could not be considered to be degrading because it did not outrage public 
opinion in the Isle of Man.147 The Court rejected the idea that public opinion in the Isle of Man 
provided a privileged insight to the truth of the protected right and argued that “…the 
Convention is a living instrument which must be interpreted in present day conditions. In the 
case now before it the Court cannot but be influenced by the developments and commonly 
accepted standards of the penal policy of the Member States”.148 The Court went on to argue 
that the very nature of judicial corporal punishment is that it involves one human being 
inflicting physical violence on another human, and that this amounted to an institutionalized 
assault on a person’s dignity and physical integrity, and found a violation of Article 3.149 
 
In Marcx v Belgium150 , the Court referred to two international conventions, the Brussels 
Convention on the Establishment of Maternal Affiliation of Natural Children and the European 
Convention on the Legal Status of Children Born out of Wedlock as a way to demonstrate the 
existence of commonly accepted standards.151 This marked a shift from commonly accepted 
standards in domestic legislations to signs of evolution and attitudes amongst modern 
societies.152 Letsas argues that this was indication that “living instrument” means keeping 
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pace with evolving European attitudes and beliefs rather than legislation found in the majority 
of Member States.153 
 
In Dudgeon v UK that will be further analysed in the next chapter, the Court argued that the 
contemporary understanding of homosexuality in the Member States is not merely different 
but better than the time when the legislation criminalising male homosexual sex was 
enacted.154 Letsas argues that “better” meant “towards the truth of the substantive protected 
right”.155 
 
As Letsas’ analysis of the principle of evolutive interpretation reveals, the abovementioned 
case law suggests that the Court believes there is an objective substance of the protected 
right, that evolution is important only because and when it gets this value right, and also that 
for the evolution to constitute a standard of correctness, there need not be a concrete 
consensus among Member States.156  However the judicial activism Letsas calls for risks 
being perceived as the Court illegitimately enlarging its role and exceeding its given functions 
of interpretation. 157  Therefore the Court while applying the abovementioned tools in its 
interpretation also uses a tool of judicial self-restraint, the margin of appreciation. 
 
4. The Margin of Appreciation158 
 
The margin of appreciation has been defined by scholars in many ways159, one of which is 
“room for manoeuvre the judicial institutions at Strasbourg are prepared to accord national 
authorities in fulfilling their Convention obligations.”160 The Handyside v. UK case was an 
important step in the development of the margin of appreciation doctrine, where the Court 
famously declared that “It is not possible to find in the domestic law of the various contracting 
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states a uniform European conception of morals.” and “By reason of their direct and 
continuous contact with the vital forces of their countries, state authorities are in principle in a 
better position than the international judge to give an opinion on the exact content of these 
requirements as well as on the necessity of a restriction or penalty intended to meet them.161”  
 
Although there is no clear and exhaustive list of principles that determine the scope of the 
margin of appreciation, factors which seem to influence the Court’s choice in the matter can 
be distinguished in Court jurisprudence 162 . For example, in Buckley v UK, the court 
determined that that the scope of the margin of appreciation would not be identical in each 
case but would vary according to context and that the relevant factors would include the 
nature of the right concerned, the importance of the right for the individual and the nature of 
the activities concerned163.  Similarly in Dudgeon v UK the Court explained that not only the 
nature of the aim of the restriction but also the nature of the activities involved would affect 
the scope of the margin of appreciation164, if an activity is of “intimate nature”, the margin of 
appreciation would be narrow. Existence or lack of consensus across contracting states is 
another factor that determines the width of the margin of appreciation, as demonstrated in 
Evans v UK (2007)165, the margin of appreciation is likely to be wide when there is no 
international or European consensus on the matter. Likewise, as demonstrated in Marckx v 
Belgium (1979)166, the fact that the member states to the Council of Europe have evolved and 
are continuing to evolve towards judicial recognition of a matter narrows the margin of 
appreciation of the state on the matter.  
 
In the case where the margin of appreciation is narrow, the Court expects states to produce 
“very weighty reasons” in order to justify the interference167. In the case where the margin of 
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appreciation is wide however, the Court will relatively easily accept the arguments advanced 
by governments.168 
 
The margin of appreciation doctrine is widely criticised in the way that it encourages non-
uniform applications that by some are said to be subjectivist and relativist, and therefore 
inconsistent with the very idea of the universality of human rights and the rule of law169. It has 
been claimed that the Court should abandon the doctrine because in matters of human rights 
there can be no room for a margin of appreciation, no room for enabling the states to decide 
what is acceptable and what is not, depriving individuals of the protection to which they are 
entitled under the Convention170. The counterargument frequently deployed against this view 
is that even though there are innate and unchanging rights every person is entitled to by way 
of being human, differences in legal traditions, constitutional values and historical 
developments171 need to be taken into consideration and as the Court’s function is to monitor 
the actions of the Contracting States which hold primary responsibility for the protection of 
human rights, the margin of appreciation is a good mechanism through which a “tight or slack 
rein” is kept by the Court on State conduct. 172 It is also claimed that in the absence of such a 
doctrine as the margin of appreciation, the Court would be perceived to be imposing solutions 
from the outside without paying regard to the knowledge and responsibilities of the local 
decision-makers173, which would in turn endanger state compliance with Court decisions.  
 
The Court’s overall approach in interpreting the Convention has been summarised as an 
evolutive approach based on the object and purpose of the Covention restricted by 
awareness of its own subsidiary role as an international court. 174  As observed by Paul 
Mahoney, judicial activism represented by evolutive interpretation and judicial self-restraint 
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represented by the margin of appreciation mirror the very nature of the Convention as an 
international treaty intended to secure effective protection of human rights.175 
 
Now that the general interpretation of the treaty has been discussed, it should be beneficial to 
briefly explain the interpretation of Article 8 before moving on to analysing the margin of 
appreciation afforded to the states in Article 8 criminalisation cases. 
 
B) The Interpretation of Article 8 
 
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence. 
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except 
such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests 
of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention 
of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights 
and freedoms of others. 
 
Article 8 has been said to be the “least defined and most unruly of the rights enshrined in the 
Convention”.176  None of the four interests covered in the article -private life, family life, home 
and correspondence- have been defined by the Convention, and they are not bound by 
domestic definitions either; they are autonomous concepts and their content is a matter of 
interpretation by the Court.177 This study is interested in the scope of the “right to respect for 
private life” as contained in Article 8.  
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1. Paragraph 1, Right to Respect for Private Life 
 
According to the Court’s case law, “private life” in Article 8 is a broad term not susceptible to 
exhaustive definition.178 Case law has shown that it encompasses many areas of human life 
such as one’s name, education, professional activities, and more. The areas of human life 
contained in the right to respect for private life that are relevant for the purposes of this study 
include the physical and moral integrity of the person including their sexual life,179 and the 
right to self-determination and personal autonomy.180 Once it has been established that there 
has been an interference with the right to private life, it will be examined whether this 
interference constituted a violation of the right, following the boundaries contained in 
paragraph 2. 
 
2. Paragraph 2, Justification Clause 
 
Paragraph 2 of Article 8 lays down the conditions upon which the state may legitimately 
interfere with the enjoyment of the right defined in paragraph 1.181 Justification clauses such 
as paragraph 2 for the limitation of human rights serve the purpose of balancing the interests 
of the community against the interests of the individual; and this balancing is where the 
political nature of the choices facing the Court are most obvious.182 If the Court is convinced 
that the interference was in accordance with the law, it pursued one of the legitimate aims 
mentioned in the paragraph and the interference was necessary in a democratic society in the 
pursuit of the said legitimate aims, it will decide that there was no violation of Article 8. 
 
2.1. Was the interference “in accordance with the law”? 
 
The interference of public authority with the private life of the individual must be in accordance 
with the law 183 , which means that the state must point to some specific legal rule that 
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authorizes the interference it seeks to justify.184 It is not sufficient that the said rule merely 
exist, it must be compatible with the rule of law, clear, foreseeable, and adequately 
accessible.185 Since this study deals with criminalisation, cases this study is concerned with 
do not raise many problems with the interference being in accordance with the law, since the 
interference itself is the law.  
 
2.2. Did the interference pursue a “legitimate aim”? 
 
It is for the state concerned to argue that the interference pursues one or more of the 
legitimate aims stated in paragraph 2 of the Article. 186  The interferences this study is 
concerned with have been argued by states to legitimately pursue the protection of health, 
morals or the rights and freedoms of others. Applicants frequently challenge the aims that 
states put forward, insisting that the aim claimed to be pursued by the state is not the real 
reason for the interference. 187  If the state concerned lists more than one aim for the 
interference the Court is satisfied that the intervention was necessary for the protection of one 
of these aims, it will not consider the other aims since the absence of a violation will have 
already been established.188 
 
2.3. Was the interference “necessary in a democratic society”? 
 
The legality and legitimacy of the interference do not guarantee its compliance with Article 8, 
the interference that is in accordance with the law and pursues a legitimate aim also needs to 
be “necessary in a democratic society”, which is a phrase heavy with uncertainty.189 It is here 
in the determination of necessity where the tension created by the collision between the 
individual and society resides.190 
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The Court in its case law has established that “necessary” is not synonymous with 
“indispensible”, but it isn’t as flexible as expressions such as “useful” “reasonable” or 
“desirable”,191 the notion of necessity implies that the interference corresponds to a “pressing 
social need” and that it is “proportionate” to the legitimate aim pursued.192 Only the minimum 
interference which secures the legitimate aim will be permitted.193  
 
Do the interests of society as a whole override the interest of the individual in the particular 
case concerned?194 To what extent should the Court defer to the state’s interpretation in 
allowing a limitation on the rights guaranteed by the Convention? 195  This is where the 
previously mentioned margin of appreciation comes into play.  
 
It is important to explain at this stage that scholars have observed that the Court uses the 
term “margin of appreciation” for two different purposes. The first use is in answering the 
question of whether societal interests override the interest of the individual in the case 
concerned. When the Court does the balancing required by the justification clause in 
paragraph 2 and decides that the intervention was justified because the test of necessity was 
satisfied, it may say that the state remained in its margin of appreciation and did not violate 
the right. Letsas calls this first use the “substantive concept of the margin of appreciation”. 196 
The second use of the term, which Letsas calls the “structural concept of the margin of 
appreciation” is present when the Court refrains from a substantive human rights review on 
the basis that there is no consensus among contracting states on the issue.197 While the 
substantive concept of the margin addresses the relationship between individual freedoms 
and collective goals, the structural concept of the margin limits the intensity of the review of 
the Court in view of its status as an international tribunal, it is more about the relationship 
between the Court and the individual autonomy of the state.198 When the lack of consensus 
among Member States results in a wide margin of appreciation, or when the Court defers to 
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the decision by the national authorities because they are better placed than the international 
judges to decide on politically sensitive issues in their state, it is the structural use of the term 
that is in use.199 
 
Letsas argues that the substantive use of the margin of appreciation should not be referred to 
as the “margin of appreciation” at all, that it would be enough just to state that the right was 
not violated rather than say that the state remained in its margin of appreciation.200 
  
This study will consider all instances where the Court refers to the “margin of appreciation” 
and use the term for both concepts when analysing how considerations that are already 
present in criminal theory affected the Court’s decisions. Further reference will be made to the 
distinction between the two separate uses in Chapter 4, Observations. 
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CHAPTER III- CASE ANALYSIS 
 
This chapter will analyse the case law of the Court of criminalisation cases under the right to 
respect for private life with the aim to identify whether the Court consistently invokes 
recognizable principles of criminalisation as it determines the breadth of the margin of 
appreciation to be accorded to the state for legitimate criminalisation.  
 
The Court states in A.D.T. v. UK that “It is not the Court’s role to determine whether legislation 
complies with the Convention in the abstract. The Court will therefore consider the 
compatibility of the legislation in the present case with the Convention in the light of the 
circumstances of the case”;201 yet there have been instances where it has conducted analysis 
verging on the abstract consideration of the criminal law in isolation. 202 A.B. and C. v. Ireland 
where the Court considers broadly the proportionality of the abortion prohibitions with the right 
to private life, Dudgeon v. UK where the Court chose to see whether the criminalisation of 
homosexual sex was in violation of the right to private life even though the law had not been 
enforced on the applicant,203 Pretty v. UK where the applicant complained against the blanket 
nature of the criminal law on assisted suicide are good examples of this.204 These decisions 
provide information on the stance of the Court as to the boundaries of substantive 
criminalisation from a human rights perspective, and although they are only binding on the 
state concerned, they create precedent for future cases.205 
 
The cases that will be analysed in this chapter have been chosen as they are representative 
of the Court’s stance on the boundaries of criminalisation under the right to private life 
enshrined in the Convention. The cases that will be analysed are Dudgeon v. UK on the 
criminalisation of private male homosexual activity between two persons, Laskey, Jaggard 
and Brown v. UK on the criminalisation of consensual assault in the form of sadomasochism, 
A.D.T. v. UK on the criminalisation of homosexual activity practised in the presence of more 
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than two persons, Pretty v. UK on the criminalisation of assistance to suicide, A.B.C. v. 
Ireland on the criminalisation of abortion and Stübing v. Germany on the criminalisation of 
consensual incest.206 The cases will be analysed in chronological order as the Court has 
frequently referenced previous decisions in its discussions.  
 
Dudgeon v. United Kingdom (1981) 
 
Facts 
Mr. Dudgeon, resident in Northern Ireland, 35 years of age at the time and homosexual, 
complained against the existence of laws criminalizing homosexual acts between consenting 
adult males in Northern Ireland after the Police found personal papers in his house that were 
descriptive of homosexual behaviour when they entered his house with a warrant to search 
for drugs.207 He was interrogated at the Police station about his homosexuality, and his file 
was brought to the prosecutor who decided to discontinue the proceedings reasoning that it 
would not be in the public interest to continue them.208  
 
The law in question concerning “buggery”, which came into force in 1861, made it criminal to 
attempt or to have “sexual intercourse per anum by a man with a man or a woman, or per 
anum or per vaginam by a man or a woman with an animal”. 209  Anyone could bring a 
prosecution for the offence.210 The other law in question that came into force in 1885 made it 
criminal for any male person to commit “gross indecency” with another male either in public or 
private and “gross indecency” was not statutorily defined but it meant any act other than that 
which constitutes “buggery”, thus it would usually take the form of mutual masturbation, inter-
crural or oral-genital contact.211 
 
The 1861 and 1885 Acts had in fact been passed by the United Kingdom Parliament, and 
came into force in England, Wales and all Ireland (which was then an integral part of the 
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United Kingdom) 212 . Later in England and Wales male homosexual activity was 
decriminalised in 1967, but the law in Northern Ireland remained the same. 213 
 
Legitimate aim 
The aim pursued by the legislation was the “protection of morals”. 214  The Government 
claimed that the legislation was also aiming at protecting the “rights and freedoms of others” 
since they perceived homosexual sex as harmful for the young, but the Court rejected this 
claim and asserted that it was the moral interests of the young that were of concern to the 
State and this concern was already contained in the aim of the protection of morals.215 
 
Necessary in a democratic society 
The Court stated that in assessing whether the law in question remained in the bounds of 
what is necessary in a democratic society,216 the fact that the protection of morals was at 
issue would render the margin of appreciation extensive; because “the requirements of 
morals vary from time to time and place to place”. 217 This practice of the Court which holds 
that common approaches to morality are determinative to the legitimacy of criminal law clearly 
resonates more with the legal moralist conceptions of criminal legal theory218 than liberal 
minimalist ones.219 However the Court did not stop there and went on to explain that not only 
the nature of the aim of the restriction but also the nature of the activities involved would 
affect the scope of the margin of appreciation;220 and since the present case concerned a 
“most intimate aspect of private life”, particularly serious reasons would be required before 
interferences on the part of the public authorities could be legitimate for the purposes Article 
8/2.221 This reasoning that there is a core aspect of private life that cannot generally be 
infringed upon can be most closely associated with the notion of autonomy that is present in 
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criminal legal theory.222  The Court then went on to balance the concept of personal autonomy 
against the interests of society represented by “the protection of morals. 223  
 
In determining whether the restriction was proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued, 224 the 
Court started by confirming that there indeed were differences between Northern Ireland and 
Great Britain in relation to questions of morality, Northern Irish society being more 
conservative and placing more emphasis on religious factors, and added that the fact that 
similar measures were not considered necessary in other parts of the UK or in other Member 
States of the COE did not mean that they could not be considered necessary in Northern 
Ireland.225 To the Court, the “genuine and sincere conviction shared by a large number of 
responsible members of the Northern Irish community that a change in the law would be 
seriously damaging to the moral fabric of society” was “certainly relevant” for the purposes of 
Article 8/2.226 This reasoning of the Court demonstrates that the “morals” to be protected need 
not be based on a critical morality reasoned from specific principles, but can include any 
generally accepted norm in a society.227 
 
The Court went on to explain that as compared with the era the legislation was enacted there 
was a “better” understanding at the time of the hearing and more tolerance towards 
homosexuality in Council of Europe States, and declared that it could not overlook the 
changes in society and legislation that had taken place with time. 228 This recognition of the 
Court of changing standards further supports the “community consensus” line of reasoning 
the Court follows, it is the prevailing social position that determines the extent to which 
criminal law restrictions can be placed on individual rights.229 Indeed, the fact that in Northern 
Ireland itself authorities had refrained in the previous years from enforcing the laws in 
question and there had been no public demand for stricter enforcement of the law was 
essential to the decision of the Court when it determined that there was no “pressing social 
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need” 230 for the interference in question. 231 This reasoning has led one commentator to argue 
that the decision in Dudgeon was not that it was unacceptable that a fundamental right was 
limited only because there was a sentiment of intolerance in the community, the decision was 
that because the sentiment of intolerance had decreased over time, and it no longer 
represented majoritarian view, the criminalisation of homosexual activity in private was found 
to be in violation of the right.232 
 
It was also central to the Court’s decision however that there was no evidence that the lack of 
enforcement of the law had caused any injury to moral standards, there was no sufficient risk 
of harm to vulnerable sections of society requiring protection.233 The use of the word “harm” 
here does not point to a detailed concept of harm, it is used in a general sense of negative 
consequences. 234  
 
The Court reasoned that arguments for retaining the law in force such as the argument that 
members of the public who regard homosexuality as immoral may be shocked, offended and 
disturbed were outweighed by the detrimental effects the very existence of the said law can 
have on the life of a person of homosexual orientation like the applicant.235 The fact that the 
Court referred to “offense” separately, after having settled that the act in question was not 
“harmful” is indicative of its acknowledgement of “offense” as separate from “harm”,236 and its 
rejection of Devlin’s understanding of harm that includes offense in it. As stated in Chapter 1, 
Feinberg argued against Devlin that the causing of universally disliked mental states was a 
separate and distinct legitimizing principle for criminalisation. 237 The Court acknowledged that 
offense might be caused to some members of the community, but rejected this offense as a 
legitimizing reason for criminalisation. 238 
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Laskey, Jaggard and Brown v. UK (1997) 
 
Facts 
In 1987 the police came into possession of some video films made during sadomasochistic 
encounters involving the applicants and forty-four other men. The applicants and several 
other men were charged with a series of offences including assault and wounding relating to 
sadomasochistic activity that had been taking place for over ten years, and although the 
instances were very numerous, the prosecution limited the counts to a small number of 
exemplary charges.239  
 
The sadomasochistic activity in question was consensual and conducted in private for no 
other purpose than sexual gratification and did not lead to any instances of infection, 
permanent injury or need for medical attention, but there were instances of “branding” and 
infliction of injuries which resulted in the flow of blood.240  
 
When the applicants appealed, the decision in the House of Lords was that even though 
consent is a defence against prosecution for the infliction of bodily harm in the course of some 
“lawful activities”, this defence should not be extended to the infliction of bodily harm in the 
course of sadomasochistic encounters. The reasons put forward for this view ranged from 
“The violence of sadomasochistic encounters involves the indulgence of cruelty by sadists 
and the degradation of victims. Such violence is injurious to the participants and unpredictably 
dangerous.” and, “Society is entitled and bound to protect itself against a cult of violence. 
Pleasure derived from the infliction of pain is an evil thing. Cruelty is uncivilised.”241 to the 
argument that there were potential health risks such as the transmission of HIV or the 
infection of wounds, and the argument that it was a real danger that young men could be 
corrupted because the recording of videos suggested that secrecy may not be as strict as 
appellants claimed. 242 Dissenting opinions suggested that the matter at hand was a matter of 
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policy in an area where social and moral factors were extremely important and attitudes could 
change.243 
 
Legitimate aim 
The legitimate aim pursued was uncontestedly the “protection of health or morals”.244 The 
Court only considered the protection of health and when it found that the interference was 
justified for this purpose, did not need to consider the protection of morals.   
 
Necessary in a democratic society 
The Court stated that one of the roles the State is unquestionably entitled to is to seek to 
regulate activities which involve the infliction of physical harm;245 and that the level of harm 
that should be tolerated when the victim consents to it is in the first instance a matter for the 
State concerned to determine since what is at stake is related to public health considerations, 
the general deterrent effect of criminal law and the personal autonomy of the individual.246 For 
the Court then, prevention of bodily harm was certainly a reason for which the criminal law 
may be used,247 and it would be up to the state to determine the cases in which the consent 
of the victim would constitute a defence248 against prosecution. In terms of criminal theory, 
this would mean that the Court does not oppose impure criminal paternalism which is the 
criminalisation of harm done to a consenting other.  
 
Drawing on the fact that the sadomasochistic activities of the applicants involved “a significant 
degree of injury or wounding which could not be characterised as trifling or transient” the 
Court was not persuaded by the claim of the applicants that the issue at hand was an issue of 
private morality that was not the State’s business to regulate; and added that this in itself was 
sufficient to distinguish the present case from the ruling in Dudgeon.249 The Court similarly 
rejected the claim of the applicants that no prosecution should have been brought against 
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them because no severe injury had been inflicted and no medical treatment had been 
required and stated that State authorities were entitled to have regard to not only the injury 
that had been caused but also the “potential harm inherent in the acts in question”250. The 
presence of the risk of harm to consenting others then, brought the discussion to a different 
plain than it was in the homosexuality case where no harm was done. The Court’s not having 
considered the presumably informed wishes, desires or aspirations of the individuals who 
participate in sadomasochistic activity as victims251 is indicative of the fact that it is not soft 
paternalism that justified criminalisation in the eyes of the Court. 
 
The Court found that the national authorities were entitled to consider that the prosecution 
and conviction of the applicants were necessary in a democratic society for the protection of 
health within the meaning of Article 2/8.  
 
A.D.T v. UK (2000) 
 
Facts 
The case concerned the applicant, “a practising homosexual” having been convicted of  
“gross indecency” on account of videotapes found by the police in the applicant’s home that 
contained footage of the applicant engaging in oral sex and mutual masturbation with four 
other adult men in his own home. 252  
 
The Sexual Offences Act of 1967 provided that homosexual acts in private between two 
consenting adult men were no longer an offence, but when “more than two persons take part 
or are present” the act would no longer be considered to be conducted in “private”; therefore 
the applicant’s conduct constituted the offence “gross indecency”.253  
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Private life  
The Government claimed that the case fell outside of the scope of “private life” because of the 
number of individuals involved and because there was a video recording of the act.254 The 
Court referred to Laskey, to the fact that no question had been raised there as to whether the 
number of participants in the act made it so that the act would not fall in the scope of private 
life, and decided to only answer the claim that the existence of the videotapes made the 
present case fall out of the scope of private life. The Court found that the applicant had gone 
to lengths not to reveal his sexual orientation and would not knowingly be involved in the 
making of the tapes public, which made the case fall entirely within the notion of private life. 
255  
 
Legitimate aims 
The aims of the legislation were the protection of morals and the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others.256 It is not clear why the “protection of the rights and freedoms of others” 
was taken to be one of the legitimate aims of the legislation here, where this was not the case 
in Dudgeon. In any case, the “protection of the rights and freedoms of others” being stated as 
an aim concerning the criminalisation of purely private conduct involving consenting adults 
and no public health considerations involved would be alarming from a liberal criminal 
theoretical perspective; nevertheless the Court does not refer to the rights and freedoms of 
others again, and this statement of it as a legitimate aim does not have any effect on the 
decision.  
 
Necessary in a Democratic Society 
The Court found that in the present case the applicant was involved in sexual activities with a 
restricted number of friends in circumstances in which it was most unlikely that others would 
become aware of what was going on. The genuinely private nature of the activities resulted in 
the margin of appreciation being narrow as it was in Dudgeon. 257 Given the narrow margin of 
appreciation related to the purely private nature of the behaviour and the absence of any 
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public health considerations, the Court decided that the reasons submitted by the 
Government were not sufficient to justify the legislation and the prosecution.258  
 
Pretty v. UK (2002) 
 
Facts 
The Applicant suffered from motor neurone disease which is a terminal progressive disease 
that affects the voluntary muscles of the body, by which death usually occurs as a result of 
weakness of breathing muscles and no treatment can prevent the progression of the 
disease.259 At the time of the hearing the applicant was paralysed from the neck down, had no 
decipherable speech and was tied to a feeding tube, her life expectancy was “measurable 
only in weeks and months”. She wished to be able to control how and when she died, she 
wanted her husband to assist her suicide because she could not commit suicide by herself.260   
 
Suicide ceased to be a crime in England and Wales by virtue of the Suicide Act of 1961, but 
section 2/1 of the same act states that: “A person who aids, abets, counsels, or procures the 
suicide of another, shall be liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding fourteen years” 261  Case law had established that an individual may refuse to 
accept life-prolonging or life-preserving treatment.262 
 
Private life 
Even though no previous case had established that there was such a right to self-
determination contained in Article 8, the Court considered that the notion of personal 
autonomy is an important principle underlying the interpretation of its guarantees and decided 
that the case could be seen under the right to private life.263 The Court’s reasoning was that 
the ability to conduct one’s own life in a manner of one’s own choosing may also include the 
opportunity to pursue activities perceived to be of a physically or morally harmful nature to the 
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individual concerned.264 Therefore the State’s paternalistic interventions in the form of criminal 
measures aimed at protecting the consenting individual from the harm they consent to were 
seen by the Court as impinging on the right to private life of the applicant even when the harm 
concerned was of life-threatening nature.265  
 
Legitimate aim 
The legitimate aim was that of safeguarding life, and therefore it was the “protection of the 
rights of others”.266 
 
Necessary in a democratic society 
The Court found, like it had previously in Laskey, that states are entitled to regulate through 
criminal law activities which are detrimental to the life and safety of other individuals; and 
added that the more serious the harm involved, the more heavily it would weigh on the side of 
public health considerations against the countervailing principle of personal autonomy. 267 
 
The Court stated that the law concerned was aimed at protecting “the weak and the 
vulnerable and especially those who are not in a condition to take informed decisions against 
acts intended to end life or to assist in ending life.” 268  Accepting that the conditions of 
terminally ill patients would not always be the same, the Court still held that many would be 
vulnerable and that it was the vulnerability of the class that provided the rationale for the law 
in question. 269  The Court stated that in spite of the arguments as to the possibility of 
safeguards and protective procedures, “clear risks of abuse” did exist, and it would be 
primarily for the States to assess the risk and the likely incidence of abuse if the general 
prohibition on assisted suicides were to be relaxed or if exceptions were to be created. 270 
The Court did not consider that the blanket nature of the ban on assisted suicide was 
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disproportionate, 271  and concluded that the interference was justified as “necessary in a 
democratic society” for the protection of the rights of others. 272 
 
The decision of the Court in Pretty starts as if it would be compatible with Mill’s conception 
that harm to a consenting other cannot legitimately be criminalised in stating that it is 
contained in the right to private life for the individual to make their own lifestyle choices even 
when these choices will be of seriously harmful or even life-threatening nature. Even though it 
seems as if the Court does not resort to paternalistic reasoning when it argues that terminally 
ill persons may not be sufficiently free of external influences to consent, this reasoning is 
similar to soft paternalistic grounds for criminalisation which hold that criminalisation of self-
regarding harmful conduct is justified when consent is not sufficiently “voluntary”. 273 This 
reasoning is incompatible with liberal criminal theory274 which would suggest that the risk of 
uncertainties with consent in some cases cannot be a justification for a blanket ban that takes 
away the power of those who truly do consent, to consent to the harm concerned.275  
 
A., B. and C. v. Ireland (2010) 
 
Facts 
The first two applicants complained under Article 8 about the prohibition of abortion for health 
and well-being reasons and the third applicant’s complaint concerned a positive obligation of 
the state regarding Article 8.276 Since this study only deals with the negative obligation arising 
from the right to private life, the third applicant’s case will not be discussed.  
 
The first applicant, A, had become pregnant unintentionally at a time when she was 
unmarried, unemployed and living in poverty. She had four young children, the youngest 
disabled, all of whom were in foster care due to A’s alcoholism. She had remained sober in 
the year before her fifth pregnancy hoping to regain custody of her children and reunify her 
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family.277 For the same reason, when she became pregnant and decided to obtain an abortion 
in England she felt that she had to travel to England in secrecy without alerting social 
workers278. She borrowed money for the journey and operation, and on the way back from 
England she had health problems related to the operation but did not seek medical advice.279  
 
The second applicant B, had become pregnant unintentionally when the emergency 
contraception pill she took failed.280 She decided to go to England to get an abortion because 
she could not care for a child on her own at that time of her life.281 She too had difficulty 
meeting the costs of travel, and on her return to Ireland she had health problems related to 
the procedure. She was unsure of the legality of having travelled for an abortion, so she 
sought follow-up care two weeks after her return in a clinic in Dublin affiliated to the English 
clinic she had been to.282 
 
Private life 
The Court found that the prohibition of abortion in Ireland where sought for reasons of health 
and well being about which A and B complained came within the scope of Article 8,283 and it 
amounted to an interference with their right to respect for their private lives.284 
 
Legitimate aim 
The Court found that the restriction pursued the legitimate aim of the protection of morals of 
which the protection in Ireland of the right to life of the unborn was one aspect, referring to its 
previous case law in the Open Door case and Vo where the Court had decided that it was 
neither desirable nor possible to answer the question of whether the unborn was a person. 285 
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Necessary in a democratic society 
The Court stated that there can be no doubt as to the “acute sensitivity of the moral and 
ethical issues raised by the question of abortion or as to the importance of the public interest 
at stake”, which meant that a broad margin of appreciation was to be accorded the state.286 
However there was consensus among a substantial majority of Council of Europe states 
towards allowing abortion on broader grounds than accorded under Irish law.287 The Court 
nevertheless did not decide that this consensus would narrow the broad margin of 
appreciation of the State, because there was no European consensus on the scientific and 
legal definition of the beginning of life.288 It was impossible to answer the question of whether 
the unborn was a person to be protected for the purposes of Article 2.289  
 
The Court added that the margin of appreciation accorded to the state was broad but not 
unlimited, and the Court would decide whether the interference constituted a proportionate 
balancing of the interests involved because a prohibition of abortion to protect unborn life 
could not automatically justify the interference on the basis that the expectant mother’s right 
to respect for private life was of a lesser stature. 290  
 
While admitting that the process of traveling abroad for abortion was psychologically and 
physically arduous for A and B, having regard to the right to travel abroad lawfully for an 
abortion with access to appropriate information and medical care in Ireland, the Court did not 
consider that the prohibition in Ireland of abortion for health and well being reasons exceeded 
the margin of appreciation, based on the profound moral beliefs of the Irish people as to the 
nature of life and the protection to be accorded to the right to life of the unborn.291 The Court 
found that the prohibition struck a fair balance between the right of A and B to respect for their 
private lives and the rights invoked on behalf of the unborn, and found no violation.292  
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As has been seen, not many tools of criminal legal theory were used in the case of A.B. and 
C. This is due to the fact that the Court defers to state authorities after having established that 
no European consensus exists on the legal definition of the beginning of life. It is not possible 
to find an equivalent of European consensus in criminal legal theory since criminal legal 
theory deals with national law. One comment that can be made is that the sensitivity of the 
subject being deployed as a reason to broaden the margin of appreciation was again 
supportive of legal moralism.  
 
Stübing v. Germany (2012) 
 
Facts 
The applicant, because he was placed in a foster home at the age of 3 and adopted by 
another family at the age of 7 after which he had no contact with his family of origin, was 
unaware of the existence of his biological sister with whom he re-established contact in 
2000. 293  Following their mother’s death in 2000 the relationship between the biological 
siblings intensified, and as from January 2001 they started engaging in  consensual sexual 
intercourse294. The applicant and his biological sister had four children together, and following 
the birth of the fourth child the applicant underwent a vasectomy. 295  The applicant was 
convicted on charges of incest several times, and the fact that he reoffended was taken to be 
an aggravating factor along with the fact that he had unprotected sex with his biological sister 
even though he was aware of pregnancy risks.296 
 
The applicant’s biological sister S.K. had also been charged with the same offence but 
following an expert opinion that stated she had a “very timid, withdrawn and dependent 
personality structure” that led her to being dependent on the applicant, she was not 
sentenced.297 
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The Court considered that the criminal conviction interfered with the applicant’s right to private 
life because he was forbidden to have sexual intercourse with the mother of his four 
children.298 
 
Legitimate Aim 
The interference was aimed at the “protection of morals” and the “rights of others”.299  
 
Necessary in a Democratic Society 
Even though the interference had been with a most intimate aspect of private life and this 
usually called for a narrow margin of appreciation, the Court considered that the lack of 
consensus among member states and the fact that the case raises sensitive moral and ethical 
issues would mean that the margin would have to be wider because State authorities are in a 
better position to give an opinion on the “exact content of the requirement of morals” in their 
country.300 As has been previously commented on and will be further discussed in the next 
chapter, this widening of the margin when it comes to sensitive moral issues amounts to a 
legal moralist view of criminal law which is incompatible with liberal criminal theory. The Court 
observed that twenty-four of the forty-four member States criminalised consensual incest and 
decided that the broad consensus among the States on the matter and the lack of empirical 
support to assume that there was a general trend towards decriminalisation would mean that 
the State would enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in determining how to confront 
incestuous relationships between consenting adults.301 No equivalent of the weight given to 
international consensus or the lack of it exists in criminal legal theory. 
 
As Stübing is the only case examined in this study that concerns the continental criminal law 
system, it should be appropriate to comment on the “legally protected values” claimed by the 
state that justify criminalisation in national law in accordance with the Rechtsgut theory 
explained in Chapter 1. The State claimed that the legislation was aimed at protecting 
“marriage and the family” and “the weaker partner in the relationship”, and preventing genetic 
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damage. Again, as discussed in Chapter 1, there is much dispute as to what constitutes a 
“Rechtsgut” therefore it is not easy to argue that the interests stated by Germany would not 
constitute legal goods worth protecting.302 
 
The Court decided that the reasoning of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany that 
sexual relationships between siblings could seriously damage “family structures” and “society 
in its entirety” as a consequence, appeared not to be unreasonable.303 This risk of serious 
damage to the stated interests “family structures” and “society” of contraceptively protected, 
privately performed and consensual incest, as Malby comments, would not amount to “harm” 
in the sense that Feinberg understands it. 304  This is therefore another example that the 
Court’s understanding of “harm” is not always consistent.  
 
The Court also stated that criminal liability in the case was further justified by reference to the 
protection of sexual self-determination; and contended that by addressing specific situations 
arising from the interdependence and closeness of family relationships, the criminal code 
could avoid difficulties in the classification of, and defence against transgressions of sexual 
self-determination in that context. 305 This reasoning is similar to the reasoning in Pretty in 
alignment with soft paternalism that the vulnerability of the consenting “victim” made it 
legitimate for the state to criminalise the act altogether. This would again be incompatible with 
liberal criminal theory which would require that as long as “vulnerability” does not reach the 
threshold of the removal of the capacity to consent, it should not be given weight to. 306 Since 
the capacity to consent should be regarded on case-by-case basis, any blanket ban on soft 
paternalistic claims around “vulnerability” will be incompatible with liberal values.  
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The Court concluded that the applicant’s criminal conviction corresponded to a pressing 
social need, and that the domestic courts stayed within their margin of appreciation when 
convicting the applicant of incest. There had been no violation of Article 8. 307 
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CHAPTER IV- OBSERVATIONS 
 
Chapter 3 has analysed specific cases to see how the Court used reasoning that carries 
similarities to the principles of criminalisation in criminal legal theory in the determination of 
the breadth of the margin of appreciation. This chapter aims at identifying patterns in the 
similarities that have been observed, in order to establish whether the Court follows 
consistent criminal legal theoretical reasoning in this determination.  
 
I) “Harm” and the “risk of harm” widened the margin of appreciation accorded to 
the State as regards to criminalisation.  
It has been observed during the discussion in Chapter 3 that the presence of “harm” tended to 
negate the narrowing down of the margin of appreciation by the “private nature” of the cases 
concerned. The term “margin of appreciation” is being used in its substantive sense here 
since there is an examination of whether the interference is permissible and the presence of 
harm weighs on the side of public interests rather than individual ones.308 
 
 In Dudgeon and A.D.T. the Court explicitly stated that the absence of “harm” combined with 
the private nature of the conduct led to the Court’s finding of a violation of Article 8. In 
Dudgeon it was that there was no evidence of the lack of enforcement having caused any 
“injury” to moral standards and no sufficient risk of harm to vulnerable sections of society 
requiring protection, 309 and in A.D.T. the Court followed the same logic and added that there 
were no public health considerations involved in the case. Conversely in Laskey, bodily harm 
was present, and the Court reasoned that the level of harm that should be tolerated when the 
“victim” consents to it was a matter for the State concerned to determine since what was at 
stake was related to public health considerations. This was the reason why no violation of 
Article 8 was found in Laskey.310 In Pretty the Court mentioned harm in stating that the more 
serious the harm consented to, the more it would weigh on the side of public interest, against 
individual autonomy311. 
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Even though it can be observed that the presence or lack of harm affected the margin of 
appreciation, it is hard to make out the definition of “harm” employed by the Court. Indeed, as 
explained in Chapter 1, criminal legal theorists have defined and used the term “harm” in their 
separate ways with the purposes of the harm principle that holds that only those acts which 
cause harm to others should be criminalised. For Devlin “immoral” conduct is capable of 
“affecting society injuriously” and therefore it may legitimately be criminalised under the “harm 
principle”.312 Harcourt argues that this definition of “harm” collapses the harm principle into 
legal moralism and makes it possible to pursue legal moralistic aims hiding under the guise of 
respect for the harm principle. 313  For Feinberg, harm as a legitimising principle for 
criminalisation should represent a setback of interests that wrong the victim in a morally 
indefensible manner.314  
 
The finding of the Court in Dudgeon and A.D.T. that no harm was present is indicative of the 
fact that the Court’s understanding of harm in those cases was not in alignment with that of 
Devlin, since Devlin would argue that the offense caused to society would amount to harm. In 
fact in Dudgeon the “offense” to be caused to some members of society is explicitly 
mentioned and not accepted to amount to “harm”, which is closer to Feinberg’s understanding 
of harm and offense, the offense principle constituting a separate principle of justification for 
criminalisation.315  The Court’s conception of harm when it finds in Stübing that incest is 
“injurious” to family structures and therefore society however, is incompatible with how 
Feinberg defines harm, mainly because there are no setback of interests as long as the act is 
consensual, private and contraceptively protected.316 Malby has similarly observed that the 
Court generally uses the term “harm” in a relatively non-specific way, including drawing the 
harm principle from philosophy in its broadest sense. 317 
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II) The presence of “vulnerability” widened the margin of appreciation accorded 
to the State as regards to criminalisation. 
It has been observed that in cases concerning a consenting “victim” who is in a vulnerable 
position due to the situation they are in, the margin of appreciation accorded to the state for 
criminalisation tended to be wide. The term “margin of appreciation” here is again being used 
in its substantive meaning because the possible vulnerability of the class of persons the victim 
belongs to tips the balance between individual freedoms and collective goals to the side of 
collective goals.318 
 
In Pretty the vulnerability of terminally ill patients as a class, the fact that they may not be 
sufficiently free of external influences for their consent to be entirely “voluntary”, was seen by 
the Court as reason to widen the margin of appreciation accorded to the State. 319 The Court’s 
reasoning was that it should be left for the States to assess the risks of abuse and decide 
whether the blanket ban should be relaxed and exceptions should be created.  320 Again in 
Stübing the female partner’s “vulnerability” was the reason for the Court to find that the 
criminalisation of incest was not in violation of the right to private life of the applicant, because 
the interdependence and closeness of family relationships made it so that the “victim” would, 
again, not be sufficiently free of external influences for their consent to be voluntary.321  
 
This “vulnerability” argument used by the Court has been observed to be similar to the “soft 
paternalism” grounds for criminalisation322 where the State by the criminal legislation is saving 
a consenting victim from their own weak will because the victim’s consent is presumed by the 
state to not be “voluntary” under the present circumstances. It is soft paternalism that is 
present here because the State as presumed is not protecting a consenting individual from 
harm; the state is protecting a consenting individual whose vulnerability creates trouble with 
their consent, from harm. It should be noted here that this is only the case where the trouble 
with consent does not amount to a removal of the capacity to consent.  
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As discussed in Chapter 1, even the “soft” version of paternalism is problematic when it 
comes to criminal law because the individual is often better placed to make nuanced 
judgements about the effects of a contemplated action in the particular circumstances and a 
blanket ban, as in the case with assisted suicide and incest, permanently rules out the options 
of those who may genuinely voluntarily consent to the “harm” in question. 323  
 
III) The widening of the margin of appreciation when the “protection of morals” is 
concerned, amounts to legal moralism.  
As explained in Chapter 1, Devlin suggests that a society is a “community of ideas” 324 and 
therefore to preserve the very existence of society it is legitimate to use the criminal law to 
enforce moral judgements.325 The Court recognizes that the requirements of “morals” differ in 
different times and different places, and states that it is specifically for this reason that the 
margin of appreciation accorded to states must be wider when the protection of morals is 
concerned.326 . Malby comments that this reasoning of the Court that gives the prevailing 
social position on the issue determinative weight on the extent to which criminal law can 
restrict individual rights 327 adds a subjective dimension to questions of criminalisation.328 This 
resonates with legal moralist conceptions of criminal law theory. 
 
Some conceptions of the Rechtsgut theory also recognize ethical convictions of society.329 
These conceptions however are those that support the circular argument which holds that the 
“legally protected interest” can be the “welfare of society” itself, therefore allow the legislator 
to legitimise criminalisation that protects the interests they see fit.330 
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Letsas comments that when the Court refers to the protection of morals as a legitimate aim, it 
is actually referring to the moralistic preferences of the majority.331  Here the preferences of 
the majority are being used in the substantive decision of whether societal interest overrides 
individual autonomy. This is an instance where it is harder to distinguish whether it is the 
substantive or the structural use of the doctrine of the margin of appreciation that is at play, 
but it can be said to be closer to the structural use since the Court is leaving the state more 
space in doing the balancing.  
 
Similarly when weight is given to European consensus, such as in A.B.C. where the lack of 
European consensus on the legal and scientific beginning of life, and the “acute sensitivity of 
the moral and ethical issues” in Ireland amounted to the state enjoying a wide margin of 
appreciation; or in Stübing where the presence of European consensus on the criminalisation 
of consensual incest was given weight in the decision, it is the structural sense of the margin 
of appreciation that is at play. 332 As Malby contends, the European consensus standard risks 
opening the door to non-liberal moralistic preferences of the majority to authorise the use of 
state coercion in an unprincipled and arbitrary manner.333 Reference to European consensus 
however cannot be explained through the tools of criminal theory since criminal theory stays 
in the confines of national law when commenting on legal moralism.   
 
To conclude, although there do exist some identifiable patterns of reference to criminal legal 
theory in the Court’s case law, such as the reference to harm, paternalism, autonomy and 
offense, it cannot be said that the Court follows any principled reasoning compatible with a 
specific conception of criminalisation theory. This conclusion may also lead to an idea that 
even though it has been argued that the Court’s interpretation of the Convention has been 
largely liberal,334 there are instances where the Court’s case law suggests otherwise. As 
Malby concludes, no single moral-legal theory is determinative of the reasoning of the 
Court.335   
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CONCLUSION 
 
This study has aimed at searching for a principled account of the use of the margin of 
appreciation in Article 8 right to life criminalisation cases through an analysis of a number of 
selected cases, using the principles of criminalisation in criminal legal theory. Chapter 1 
explained the multiple views and principles in criminal legal theory that aim to devise a 
coherent limit to justifiable substantive criminal law. Chapter 2 described the general 
interpretation of the European Convention and the interpretation of Article 8. In Chapter 3 
selected Court decisions were analysed through the lens of criminal theory and finally in 
Chapter 4, the observations made in Chapter 3 that amounted to a pattern affecting the 
margin of appreciation were recited. The conclusion has been that although there are some 
identifiable patterns of reference to criminal legal theory in the Court’s case law, such as the 
reference to harm, paternalism, autonomy and offense, it cannot be said that the Court 
follows any principled reasoning compatible with a specific conception of criminalisation 
theory. 
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